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Abstract 
Objective: Research to date has focused on causal descriptions of residential fire fatalities and injuries, 
with an emphasis on ignition factor. This paper examines if, how and why human actions or inactions lead to 
accidental residential fires and identifies risk factors most closely associated with those fires caused by human 
unsafe behaviours. 
Methods: Interviews of 182 people who had survived accidental residential fires without serious injury 
were conducted. Each fire was classified as either 1) directly caused by human unsafe behaviours; 2) human 
long term inactions; or 3) involved NO human actions. Frequencies and odds ratio values were presented. 
Results/Discussion: Slightly less than half (46%) of the non-injury fires were directly caused by human 
unsafe behaviours, 40% involved no human actions, and 14% were associated with long-term human 
inactions. Examination of the fires caused by human unsafe behaviours compared to no human involvement 
using Odds Ratios showed that individuals in the former group were significantly more likely to be mentally 
ill, physically disabled, asleep, not in full-time paid employment and more intimate with ignition.  
Conclusions:  Many non-injury fires do not directly arise from unsafe activity and most of them were 
caused by electrical or ignition system failure. New design innovations and/or improvements in appliances 
may reduce those fires due to appliance maintenance negligence or electrical faults. Identification of the most 
high risk individuals for unsafe behaviours can help inform fire safety educational programs. 
 
Keywords: non-injury accidental residential fires, non-injured survivors, human involvement in fire ignition, 
risk factors 
 
  
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Understanding the underlying causes of accidental residential fires is critical if we are to prevent fire 
deaths, injuries, and property damage, and attempt to reduce the frequency and severity of such accidents. 
Studies of accidental residential fire fatalities and injuries have revealed that cooking-related activities and 
electrical failure were the leading causes of fire injuries while smoking-related materials accounted for most 
fatalities, followed by combustibles too close to heat (Ahrens, 2013; Xiong et al., 2015). Most importantly, the 
majority of these fires have been caused by human errors or unsafe behaviours (Miller, 2005). Typical unsafe 
behaviours include unattended cooking, smoking while falling to sleep, placing a heater or candles too close 
to combustibles and a child playing with ignition sources. The research however, has so far focussed on a 
shallow description of the causes of residential fires, in other words, the ignition factors. Little work has been 
done in the areas of why and how these errors occurred and the underlying mechanisms associated with the 
causes are rarely investigated (Hall, 2012; Shea, 2011; U.S Fire Administration, 2007). Obviously this is often 
difficult to examine in fatal fires and any survivors may have little information about circumstances at ignition.  
To help prevent accidental residential fires caused by human unsafe behaviours and to develop the most 
effective preventive intervention strategies, it is important to look at how and why humans get involved in fire 
ignition. Drawing upon interviews of individuals who have survived accidental residential fires without 
serious injuries involving extended hospitalization, this paper undertakes causal analyses of accidents to 
identify the kinds of human errors that have occurred in house fire settings. It examines the role of human 
involvement in fire ignition and explores the possible differences and similarities between non-injury house 
fires caused by human unsafe behaviours and fires where no human actions were involved. Such a deep 
exploratory analysis of the underlying circumstances of ignition and identification of those most at-risk of 
fires caused by human errors aims to provide new insights to inform preventive intervention strategies.  
 
2. Methods 
Data. Information concerning the fire incidents and contact details of potential interviewees were sourced 
from the daily records of fire incidents from the Victorian Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB, June 2010 to 
December 2011) and Country Fire Authority (CFA, January 2012 to June 2012), Australia. The potential 
interviewees were contacted when the fires met four selection criteria: 1) being residential (backyard/ 
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frontyard fires were only included if they involved a structure such as a garage or shed); 2) being accidental 
(no cases where arson or serious criminal behaviour was suspected or proven were included); 3) no death or 
serious injury with extended hospitalisation involved; and 4) significant fire and/ or smoke damage to the 
room of fire origin and/ or dwelling.  
In total, 196 interviews were conducted for this study, with one interview per fire. Of these 196 fires, 
information about 128 survivors was sourced from the MFB and 68 from the CFA. In terms of information 
obtained from the MFB, initially, approximately 53% of all fire incidents received from MFB met the above 
inclusion criteria, while 30% of the potential interviewees were not contactable by phone or letter. Decline 
rates were quite low at about 17%, and were mostly because the contacted interviewee indicated that he or she 
did not wish to be interviewed due to English language difficulties. CFA fires were handled slightly 
differently. A CFA Fire Officer examined the fire incidents attended by CFA for areas within about 200 km of 
Melbourne and contacted potential interviewees. They passed on the names and contact details of people from 
153 fire incidents, who gave initial consent to being contacted by the researchers. Full interviews were 
obtained from 68 CFA fire incidents (44%).  
Of the 196 interviews, nine were later excluded because of a large percentage of missing data concerning 
the person who was involved in the fire ignition. Of the 187 remaining fires, five incidents were known to 
have been caused directly by human actions, but it was impossible to determine who started the fire and thus 
these were also excluded. These five fires included three party fires caused by discarded cigarettes and two 
Halloween party fires caused by candles. Finally, information concerning 182 survivors of accidental 
residential fires was collected for the current analysis. This paper utilizes ‘host’ to refer to the person who was 
most closely involved in the fire start or, if this descriptor does not apply, to anyone was the person on the 
property who called the fire brigade at the time of fire. 
In order to ensure the validity and reliability of the data, information concerning some key variables such 
as ignition factors was crosschecked between data drawn from interviews and the fire records filled by the fire 
brigade who attended the incident. Confidence codes (i.e., definite, most likely, possible, unknown) were used 
for a number of variables (i.e., ignition factors, involvement in fire ignition) to describe the degree of certainty 
regarding subjective judgements made by the coder, hosts and fire brigade. The confidence code of “definite” 
is given when information is clearly stated or decided by fire brigade, hosts or other survived occupants, 
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otherwise the judgement is coded as most likely, possible, or unknown. For the data analysis, if a confidence 
level for a variable was coded as either definitely or most likely, that variable was entered as being present for 
that host. On the basis of the fact that many variables are highly inter-related, the consistency between 
variables, across cases, and over time has been checked at the time of data analysis. Files that were coded at 
the earlier versus later stages were randomly selected, 10% respectively, to check whether fires have been 
coded in a similar manner, particularly those caused by similar ignition factors (i.e., unattended cooking). A 
different coder would revisit the case if necessary.  Group discussions of potentially ambiguous coding issues 
were regularly undertaken to help ensure coding validity and reliability.  
Analysis. Frequencies and percentages were used to describe the characteristics of survived accidental 
residential fires and survivors. Binary logistic regression (unadjusted odds ratios) was undertaken to explore 
the possible differences between fires caused by human unsafe behaviours and those where no human actions 
were involved. Odds ratio analysis was not applicable for fire agent factors due to the limited number of 
events available for the two categories. In cases with less than 5 events in a category, a Fisher’s Exact Test 
was undertaken.  
The methodology of this study was approved by the institution’s Human Research Ethics Committee. It 
should be noted that there were a small proportion of fires caused by individuals who were less than 18 years 
of age or were suffering some mental illness at the time of the fire. In these cases parents or careers were 
interviewed instead, but information concerning the person who was involved in the fire ignition was 
collected. 
 
3. Results 
The result section comprises two parts. Part 1 investigates the role of human involvement in fire ignition 
(Table 1 and 2). Drawing upon odds ratio analyses (Table 3), Part 2 explores the possible differences between 
fires caused by human behaviours and those where no human actions were involved.  
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3.1. Human involvement in fire ignition 
Based on the information collected from interview, particularly regarding ignition factors and human 
activities before fire and at the time of fire ignition, the non-injury accidental residential fires were grouped 
into three broad categories: fires directly caused by human unsafe behaviours, fires caused by human long-
term inaction, and fires where no human direct actions/ inactions were involved. See Table 1 for further 
details and examples. Such classification may not cover all the circumstances that are associated with human 
involvement in fire ignition, but it provides a framework that can simplify the underlying complex 
circumstances surrounding the start of a fire from the perspective of human involvement in fire ignition.  
Fires directly caused by human unsafe behaviours. Human unsafe behaviours accounted for just under 
half the examined fires (46%, Figure 1), with the time interval between unsafe behaviours and the occurrence 
of a fire being relatively small, normally within hours or concurrently. As shown in Table 2, cooking-related 
activities (45.2%), placing combustibles too close to heat (26.2%), and a child playing with ignition sources 
(14.3%) were the leading causes of non-injury accidental residential fires caused by human direct actions. 
Only five fires (6.0%) were caused by discarded cigarettes. No appliance was involved in the ignition for 
31.7% of fires caused by human unsafe behaviours. When an appliance was involved, the stove predominated 
(71.2%), followed by heating unit (10.7%), portable cooker (7.1%) and lamp/ light globe (5.4%). One 
example for the latter is the fire caused by a boy who accidentally placed a blanket on top of a working lamp.  
Of the 38 cooking-related fires (45.2% of the total fires caused by human unsafe behaviours), 29 were 
unattended cooking. Three hosts were individuals under 18 years of age. Other cooking-related scenarios 
include placing combustibles too close to heat (i.e., paper towel), careless cooking behaviours (i.e., food left 
burning in the rubbish bin or accidently spilling the water into the hot oil), cooking appliances (i.e., stove) 
unintentionally being turned on and not turned off or being turned on wrong way. Three fires were caused by 
the oven or microwave being turned on for too long, leading to the burning food materials. Similar scenarios 
appeared in three fires caused by wheat packs that were heated for too long in the microwave. A theme of 
‘forgot’ and ‘distracted’ appeared in most interviews. Six interviewees reported that they left the property 
while cooking (i.e., picking up children, helping neighbours). Of the 22 fires caused by placing combustibles 
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too close to heat, five involved a heating unit, four were related to a working stove, three involved a working 
lamp/ light globe and ten were caused by a burning candle. 
Human long-term inactions. Fires caused by human long-term inactions mainly refer to those caused by 
long term human negligence of maintenance/ cleaning of a household appliance. Behaviours associated 
directly with such fires are largely viewed as not in themselves unsafe. An example would be placing a 
chicken in an oven filled with a buildup grease and fat. The behaviour of ‘placing a chicken in the oven’ itself 
is normal and not unsafe. It is the lack of cleaning of built up grease and fat in the oven that causes the fire. 
Fourteen percent of all the fires studied in this paper fell into this category and nearly two thirds of these 
(64.0%) were caused by a lack of maintenance/ wearing out of a house appliance, with the remainder being 
from overloaded equipment (36.0%). All fires caused by long-term human negligence involved a household 
appliance. A little less than one third of such fires involved an extraction fan (30.4%), followed by heating 
unit (21.7%), electrical distribution equipment including cord and charger (21.7%), oven (13.1%) and dryer 
(13.1%).  
No human actions involved. Many non-injury house fires (40%) were not caused by human actions, with 
faults in electrical or ignition systems accounting for the overwhelming majority (80.8%) of such fires. Fires 
caused by electrical failure include any mechanical failure/ fault/ malfunction detected or reported in electrical 
or ignition system, such as electrical distribution equipment (i.e., extension cords or plugs) or electronic 
equipment (i.e., TV, extraction fan, air conditioning unit). No appliance was involved in the ignition for 
17.4% of all fires that fell into this category. When an appliance was involved, electrical distribution 
equipment (19.3%) was the most prevalent, followed by lamp/ light globe (12.3%) or air conditioning unit 
(10.5%). In some cases human activities might have been associated with this fire category but no causal 
relationship existed between the human behaviours and fire ignition. Such activities might be viewed as 
‘normal daily activities’, rather than unsafe behaviours that may cause the fire. For example, a person turned 
on the walk-in wardrobe light, forgot to turn it off and a fire started after few hours. In this case, leaving the 
wardrobe light on is viewed as normal activity that should not pose a potential danger in daily life. It was an 
electrical fault with the wardrobe light that caused the fire.  
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3.2. Comparison between fires caused by human behaviours versus fires where no human 
actions were involved  
The frequencies of the characteristics of non-injury house fires and survivors were categorized into four 
groups: the whole sample, fires caused directly by human unsafe behaviours, fires caused by human long-term 
inactions, and fires where no human actions being involved. Drawing on this frequency tabulation (see 
Appendix A), odds ratio analyses were undertaken to examine whether these differences were statistically 
significant between fires caused directly by human unsafe behaviours and those where no human actions were 
involved. As shown in Table 3, only 9 out of 23 variables tested were significant. In comparison with fires 
where there was no human involved, fires caused by human unsafe behaviours were more likely to be 
associated with, in descending OR value order: being in room of fire origin at the time of fire ignition (OR = 
8.11), kitchen being the room of fire origin (OR = 7.16), mental illness (OR = 6.94), apartments/ units (OR = 
4.84), afternoon and evening (OR = 3.83), physical illness (OR = 3.33), not likely to be in full time paid 
employment (OR = 2.93), property not owned by the interviewee (OR = 2.91), and being asleep (OR = 2.66).  
 
4. Discussion  
Consistent with the broad literature (Ahrens, 2013; McCormick, 2009; Miller, 2005), this study supports 
previous research finding that human errors/ unsafe behaviours are associated with many accidental residential 
fire incidents. By extending this body of research, with its shallow description of human errors being the cause 
of house fires, this study further investigated the mechanisms underlying the human errors by classifying non-
injury accidental residential fires into three broad categories. These categories were based on the role of 
human involvement in fire ignition and compared possible differences across a wide range of factors. The 
three categories are: fires directly caused by human unsafe behaviours, long-term human inactions/ 
negligence, and no human actions involved. This is the first study to investigate house fires from the 
perspective of human involvement in fire ignition. 
This paper found that nearly half (46%) of non-injury house fires were caused directly by human unsafe 
behaviours and nearly half of these fires were associated with cooking-related activities. This is consistent 
with previous studies that cooking-related activities/ equipment were the leading cause of accidental house 
fires and injuries (Ahrens, 2013; U.S Fire Administration, 2007), as well as fires handled without fire 
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department assistance (Diekman et al., 2012). Between 2007 and 2011, cooking equipment was the leading 
cause (38%) of fire injuries in the US (Ahrens, 2013). Similar trends were found in Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and other countries (Australian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, 2009; McCormick, 
2009). Consistent with a report produced by U.S. Fire Administration (Fire Emergency Management Agency, 
2003), this study found that unattended cooking equipment was the leading factor contributing to cooking 
fires. Unintentionally turning the equipment (i.e., cook-top, oven) on and forgetting to turn it off or turning it 
on over an extended time was also a significant determinant of cooking equipment-related house fires. 
Interlinked smoke alarms might be effective to alert residents to unattended cooking fires where they were 
asleep or not in the room of fire origin. However this in itself will not prevent the fires from occurring. The 
real challenge is that individuals may not perceive some dangerous habitual behaviours as being problematic 
enough to stop doing, even if they have previously had unsafe outcomes. Typical scenarios included leaving 
cooking materials unattended due to distraction by other things (i.e., chatting with other people, children), or 
even leaving the property (six cases in this study). Future studies might benefit from investigating underlying 
cognitive processes that support such risky actions in order to reduce fire incidents, deaths and injuries (Warda 
& Ballesteros, 2007). The inability of people to take responsibility for actions that affect their health and 
safety is the subject of considerable research within health psychology. Key models, such as the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour and Health Belief Model, suggest that attitude change is necessary before behavioural 
change can occur (Montanaro & Bryan, 2014; Pearson et al., 2012; Protogerou et al., 2012)..  
One of the most important new findings is that 14% of non-injury house fires were associated with long-
term human inactions/ negligence (i.e., a lack of maintenance or cleaning of a house appliance) where the 
human behaviours before and at the time of ignition can be viewed ‘normal/ not unsafe’ and the time intervals 
between human activities and fire ignition was days or even years. This study highlights the need for more 
monitoring of this type of fire. For fires caused by human long-term negligence, it is not easy to identify who 
may be responsible for the fire start, as household residents should share responsibilities to maintain a fire-
safe environment. All such fires caused by long-term human negligence involved a household appliance 
where service or maintenance is expected to be undertaken on a regular basis in order to ensure safe operation. 
If maintenance was undertaken on a regular basis, many such fires could be prevented. In other cases, the fire 
may be related to an appliance not being used or maintained according to instructions. This includes 
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appliances that may overheat through having been in use beyond the recommended period of time for safe 
use. For example, electric blankets should be used only to warm the bed, should be switched off before getting 
in and be replaced after 10 years or sooner if excessively worn. Design features that warn people about the 
need for maintenance behaviours may be applicable for some appliances.  For example a warning light could 
be incorporated into a dryer to indicate that it is time to check the lint filter after a predetermined number of 
uses. A warning sound (e.g. beeping alarm) could be incorporated into extraction fans before dirt, fuel and 
ignition sources accumulated exceed a safe amount. While improved regulatory standards or protocols might 
help improve safety in some cases, in many cases it is the human behaviour that needs changing. Some 
researchers believe that many fires are preventable if the human behaviour that brings the fuel and ignition 
source together can be altered (Barillo & Goode, 1996), while others (Miller, 2005) argue that dangerous 
habitual behaviours are not readily amenable to external scrutiny as individuals may not perceive these as 
being problematic. The current data suggests that some house fires may be preventable through new design 
features being invented and/or widely incorporated for appliances to warn people that fire-safe maintenance 
behaviours are required, such as extraction fans and dryers.  Furthermore, fire services have a role to play in 
community education. Current programs that emphasise smoke alarm maintenance and testing could be 
extended to include regular maintenance of home appliances that feature in home fire ignition. 
This is the first study to compare a wide range of factors between non-injury house fires caused directly 
by human unsafe behaviours and fires where no human actions were involved. No statistically significant 
differences were found between the two groups in terms of 14 characteristics associated with house fires, but 
the two types of fires did differ significantly in eight aspects. Fires caused by human unsafe behaviours were 
more likely to occur in the kitchen, apartments/ units, and during afternoon and evening time than fires where 
no human actions were involved. Individuals with the following characteristics (in descending order of 
importance) were most likely to be directly involved in fire ignition via their direct unsafe behaviours: those in 
the room of fire origin at the time of ignition, mentally ill, physically disabled, asleep, and not likely to be in a 
full time paid occupation. The customary explanation is that people who are mentally ill, physically disabled, 
asleep and not likely to be in a full time paid occupation (retired, disability pension, child) are less likely to 
have the same detecting, coping and life skills that the rest of the population utilise every day, and 
consequently, their actions and behaviours during the fire may reduce their ability to take a rational and 
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lifesaving approach (Watts-Hampton et al., 2006). Nonetheless, the findings of this paper suggest that it is the 
involvement/ intimacy in fire ignition that places these groups of people at high risk. People with some mental 
illness, physical disability/ illness and not likely to be in a full time paid occupation are the most vulnerable 
people in our community. The reduction of fire risks, injuries and deaths for these groups may need the 
collaboration of all stakeholders involving carers, fire services, council and community services. This paper 
suggests that to reduce the possibility/ chance of their involvement/ intimacy in fire ignition might be the first 
and most important step. 
Some risk groups that are documented elsewhere to be highly related to fire fatalities and injuries were 
found not to be closely related to involvement in fire ignition in the current data.  These include being male, 
being alone, being under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and current smokers (Bruck et al., 2011; 
Buechner, 2003; Istre et al., 2001; Warda et al., 1999; Xiong et al., 2012, 2015). The present findings of less 
important relationships between these groups and their involvement in fire ignition arises partially from the 
fact that only a small proportion of people interviewed reported that they had engaged in associated risky 
behaviours, with most of them reporting to be awake and unimpaired at ignition. This finding, however, needs 
to be balanced with the possibility that those people who were heavily under the influence of alcohol or other 
substances at the time of their fire self-selected out of this study. However, these findings of different risk 
factors for people with no injuries compared to fire fatalities and injuries require replication with a larger, less 
self-selected sample. 
Drawing on the information collected from national estimates of fires reported to U.S. municipal fire 
departments during 2007 – 2011, Ahrens (2013) found that electrical distribution and lighting equipment 
ranked third in house fires (6%), fourth in house fire deaths (13%), and fourth in house fire injuries (7%). This 
study on non-jury house fires in Australia however, revealed a much high rate. The current data shows that 
40% of non-injury house fires were not caused by human actions or negligence and faults in electrical or 
ignition systems accounted for the overwhelming majority (80.8%) of such fires. Despite this difference from 
U.S. data, the present findings are consistent with some studies conducted elsewhere, such as Jakarta, 
Indonesia (Sufianto & Green, 2012) and Dubai (Alqassim & Daeid, 2014). Due to a lack of information 
concerning the failure/ faults in electrical equipment/ ignition system, it is hard to differentiate whether some 
electrical fires were caused by inappropriate installation of electrical equipment or by the shortcomings of 
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appliance design. However, that a significant proportion of fires were caused by electrical failure in the 
present data might suggest a need for continuous implementation of better quality and reliable electricity 
connection to buildings, an improvement in installation standards, and arc fault detection/protection and 
insulation monitoring to reduce residential fires (Shea, 2011; Sufianto & Green, 2012). In addition to 
improving building safety levels, residents should be trained to check and maintain electrical equipment and 
connections regularly, and most importantly to avoid overloading extension cords and to discard deteriorated 
wiring and cord sets. 
Finally, discarded cigarettes or other smoking-related materials have been consistently identified as the 
leading cause of fatal house fires (Diekman et al., 2012; Hall, 2013); however, this study found that only 2.7% 
of non-injury house fires were caused by smoking-related materials. This difference in the leading cause of 
fatal and non-fatal/non-injury house fires is of great importance for fire research and prevention intervention 
strategies. Furthermore, 14.3% of fires caused by human unsafe behaviours were associated with a child 
playing with ignition sources, suggesting closer parent supervision and/ or child resistant lighters might be 
needed (Warda & Ballesteros, 2007) 
 
5. Limitations 
The present findings should be interpreted with caution. A relatively small number of survivors were 
interviewed and the interviewed sample may not represent the whole population that had experienced fire 
incidents at the time of survey. It is possible, for example, that more people from higher socio-demographic 
areas and less people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds agreed to be interviewed. Because 
limited information was available from the MFB and CFA fire lists about the survivors, a comparison between 
people interviewed and those not contactable was not possible. Also, there are inherent methodological 
limitations associated with self-reported surveys because participants might seek to present themselves in a 
favourable manner (Thompson & Phua, 2005). Although multiple methods have been adopted in this study to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the data catergorisations, future studies are encouraged to adopt more 
advanced techniques, such as testing for a social desirability bias, to further ensure the reliability of the data 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). This study focused on non-injury fires that occurred in Victoria, Australia, and results 
might not be generalisable to people who survived residential fires and lived in other cities where 
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demographic, socioeconomic, household and environmental structures and characteristics differ. Future 
studies are encouraged to examine the role of human involvement in non-injury house fires in other countries 
and to compare fires with death, major injuries, less serious injuries, and/or no injury. Finally, the current 
classification of human involvement in fire ignition should be viewed only as exploratory as there are many 
other ways in which human actions and errors can be defined and classified.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In sum, this is the first study that goes beyond the customary shallow characterisation of human error as a 
causal factor of accidental residential fires and examines the role of human involvement in fire ignition by 
considering both direct causal relationships and time intervals between human actions and fire ignition. 
Although the classification may not cover all circumstances surrounding fire ignition, it presents important 
new information about the role of human involvement in fire ignition and some of the factors behind the 
human errors that cause house fires.  Part of the answer must be to alter human unsafe behaviours prior to fire 
ignition. Given that many fires caused by human unsafe behaviours included unattended cooking, interlinked 
smoke alarms might be effective. New design innovations and improvements in appliances may reduce those 
fires due to appliance maintenance negligence and faults. 
Although eliminating fire incidents that stem from dangerous human behaviours may never be wholly 
effective, an increased understanding of the role of human involvement in fire ignition can help inform 
preventative and fire minimisation activities. These include how to design the most effective fire safety 
educational programs that target groups at high risk of involving in fire ignition and this study provides new 
information about those most at risk for non-injury fires. The messages that need to be conveyed are fairly 
simple, for example clean your extraction fans regularly, and could easily be added to existing community fire 
safety campaigns. The assumption here is that people will alter their behavior if they know that their current 
practice is unsafe. However it is also acknowledged that human behavior is a complex phenomenon and some 
people/actions are resistant to change. 
The present classification of the three tiers of human involvement has been shown in this study to be a 
useful system and it could be used to examine changes over time, for example, and whether educational 
programs or design/technological improvements can help alter some of the risky human behaviours that cause 
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house fires. Further, understanding risk factors for accidental residential fires with uninjured survivors lays the 
foundation for subsequent comparisons with risk factors for fatal fires and fires with injuries to determine 
whether they are qualitatively different in terms of their risk factors or on a continuum.    
 
7. What is already known on the subject 
 Most accidental residential fires are caused by human errors 
 Cooking and electrical failure cause most residential fire and injuries and smoking-related materials 
cause most fatal fires 
 Some subgroups (the elderly, children, males, low SESs, alcohol and drug consumer, being asleep) 
are at high risk of fire fatalities and injuries 
 
8. What this study adds 
 Classification of accidental residential fires based on the role of human involvement in fire ignition 
 To prevent or reduce fire incidents, the intervention in human unsafe behaviour in fire ignition could 
be an important strategy 
 People who were mentally ill, physically disabled, asleep and not likely to be in a full time paid 
occupation (most retired, on disability pension, child) were more likely to be involved in fire ignition 
than their respective counterparts 
 Fires with no human involvement accounted for four out of every ten non-injury fires. 
 14% of survived fires were associated with long-term human inactions/ negligence 
 New design innovations in appliances with warning signals might be effective in preventing fires 
caused by human long-term negligence of maintenance  
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Figure 1 Survived accidental residential fires based on human involvement (n = 182) 
 
Table 1. Human involvement in fire ignition classifications. 
Human 
involvement 
Causes Time interval 
between causes 
and fire 
Human 
activity  
Who was 
involved? 
Examples 
Human 
involved 
Short-
term 
Human 
direct 
actions 
Simultaneously 
or within hours 
unsafe Person in 
direct contact 
with fire/ heat 
ignition 
sources  
• leaving cooking 
materials (i.e., oil) 
unattended burning in 
the fry pan  
• placing burning candles 
or operating heater too 
close to combustibles  
Long-
term 
Human 
inactions 
Relatively long, 
normally over 
days or years 
normal Household 
residents 
• built up grease or fat in 
the oven  
• a lack of maintenance 
of extraction fan or 
cleaning of the dryer 
filter 
No human 
involved 
Other 
causes 
Simultaneously 
or within hours, 
days or years 
normal No direct 
human 
involvement 
• lightning 
• design fault 
 
  
Human unsafe behaviours46%
Human long term inactions14%
No human actions/ inactions involved40%
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Table 2. Ignition factors and appliances involved, categorized into three groups: human involved (unsafe 
behaviour, inactions), and no human involved in the fire ignition  
Note. a includes lightening, collision, open fire, and design faults. b others includes portable refrigeration unit, 
separator motor, hand tools, household appliances not specified, and motor vehicle. 
 
 
 Human involved 
 % within column (n) 
No human 
involved 
% within 
column (n) 
Total 
 
% of Total (n) Unsafe behaviour Inactions 
Ignition factors (n=182)     
• Failure/ faults in electrical 
or ignition system 
0 0 76.5 (56) 30.8 (56) 
• Unattended cooking 34.5 (29) 0 0 15.9 (29) 
• Combustibles too close to 
heat 
26.2 (22) 0 4.1 (3) 13.7 (25) 
• Lack of maintenance/ worn 
out 
0 64.0 (16) 0 8.8 (16) 
• Child playing with ignition 
sources 
14.3 (12) 0 0 6.6 (12) 
• Cooking other 10.7 (9) 0 0 4.9 (9) 
• Overloaded equipment 0 36.0 (9) 0 4.9 (9) 
• Discarded cigarettes 6.0 (5) 0 0 2.7 (5) 
• Improper start up/ shut 
down  
3.6 (3) 0 0 1.6 (3) 
• Othersa 3.6 (3) 0 5.5 (4) 3.8 (7) 
• Undetermined 1.1 (1) 0 13.6 (10) 6.3 (11) 
Total  100.0 (84) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (73) 100.0 (182) 
Appliances involved      
• Stove  48.8 (40) 0 1.5 (1) 23.6 (41) 
• Heating unit (i.e., central, 
fixed, portable, indoor 
fireplace) 
7.3 (6) 21.7 (5) 7.2 (5) 9.2 (16) 
• Electrical distribution 
equipment, fixed wiring, 
cord, plug, charger 
1.2 (1) 21.7 (5) 16.0 (11) 9.8 (17) 
• Extraction fan 0 30.4 (7) 5.8 (4) 6.3 (11) 
• Lamp/ light globe 3.7 (3) 0 10.1 (7) 5.7 (10) 
• Portable cooker 4.9 (4) 0 4.3 (3) 4.0 (7) 
• Oven   1.2 (1) 13.1 (3) 1.5 (1) 2.9 (5) 
• Air conditioning unit 0 0 8.7 (6) 3.4 (6) 
• TV 0 0 5.8 (4) 2.3 (4) 
• Dryer  0 13.1 (3) 0 1.7 (3) 
• Dishwasher 0 0 5.8 (4) 2.3 (4) 
• Others b  1.2 (1) 0 16.0 (11) 6.9 (12) 
     Total 
% of column (% of total, n) 
68.3 (32.2, 56) 100.0 (13.2, 23) 82.7 (32.8, 57) 78.2 (136) 
• No appliance involved 31.7 (26) 0 17.3 (12) 21.8 (38) 
Total 100.0 (82) 100.0 (23) 100.0 (69) 100.0 (174) 
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Table 3. Unadjusted odds ratio (OR) analysis results for non-injury accidental residential fires caused by 
human unsafe behaviours versus fires where no human actions were involved in fire ignition, in descending 
OR order. 
 Human unsafe 
behaviour 
% (n) 
No human 
involved 
% (n) 
OR 95% CI 
Location at ignition (n=156)     
In RFO 37.3 (31) 6.8 (5) 8.11*** 2.95, 22.29 
Not in RFO 62.7 (52) 93.2 (68)   
Kitchen being RFO (n=182)     
Kitchen  56.0 (47) 15.1 (11) 7.16*** 3.31, 15.50 
Other 44.0 (37) 84.9 (62)   
Mental illness (n=141)     
Yes  29.0 (20)  5.6 (4) 6.94*** 2.23, 21.58 
No 71.0 (49)  94.4 (68)   
Type of occupancy (n=142)     
Apartment/ unit 19.2 (15) 4.7 (3) 4.84** 1.34, 17.56 
One or two family dwelling 80.8 (63) 95.3 (61)   
Time of a day (n=102)     
Afternoon & evening 75.8 (47) 45.0 (18) 3.83** 1.63, 8.98 
Other 24.2 (15) 55.0 (22)   
Physical illness (n=139)     
Yes 23.5 (16) 8.5 (6) 3.33* 1.22, 9.12 
No 76.5 (52) 91.5 (65)   
Occupation (n=138)     
Not likely to be full time paid 57.4 (39) 31.4 (22) 2.93** 1.46, 5.89 
Likely to be full time paid 42.6 (29) 68.6 (48)   
Property ownership (n=182)     
Other 45.2 (38) 22.0 (16) 2.91*** 1.47, 5.77 
Owned by interviewee 54.8 (46) 78.0 (57)   
Asleep (n=131)     
No 83.6 (51) 65.7 (46) 2.66* 1.15, 6.15 
Yes 16.4 (10) 34.3 (24)   
Pre-existing other disability 
(n=140) 
    
Yes  13.2 (9) 4.2 (3) 3.51 0.91, 13.56 
No 86.8 (59) 95.8 (69)   
Living arrangement (n=153)     
With family/ others 86.4 (70) 94.4 (68) 2.67 0.81, 8.80 
Alone   13.6 (11) 5.6 (4)   
Internal state of a dwelling (n=118)    
Clean & tidy 71.7 (43) 85.4 (35) 2.31 0.82, 6.47 
Moderately cluttered  28.3 (17) 14.6 (6)   
Season of a year (n=157)     
Other seasons 82.1 (69) 69.9 (51) 1.98 0.94, 4.20 
Summer (Dec., Jan., Feb.) 17.9 (15) 30.1 (22)   
Bedroom being RFO (n=182)     
Bedroom  21.4 (18) 12.3 (9) 1.94 0.81, 4.63 
Other 78.6 (66) 87.7 (64)   
External condition to a building (n=105)    
Good overall condition 93.1(54) 89.4 (42) 1.61 0.41, 6.36 
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State of disrepair 6.9 (4) 10.6 (5)   
Previous fire experience 
(n=128) 
    
Yes 79.7 (47) 84.1 (58) 1.34 0.55, 3.33 
No  20.3 (12) 15.9 (11)   
Country origin (n=91)     
Overseas  37.3 (25) 30.9 (21) 1.33 0.65, 2.72 
Australia  62.7 (42) 69.1 (47)   
Fire safe knowledge (n=152)     
No or basic/ general 
knowledge 
 73.0 (46) 77.6 (52) 1.28 0.58, 2.85 
Some specific learning 27.0 (17) 22.44 (15)   
Age (n=136)     
18 – 59 years of age 83.1 (54) 80.3 (57) 1.21 0.50, 2.89 
60 + 16.9 (11)  19.7 (14)   
Sex (n=157)     
Male 48.8 (41) 46.6 (34) 1.09 0.58, 2.05 
Female   51.2 (43) 53.4 (39)   
Alcohol use (n=131)     
Yes 13.8 (9) 10.6 (7) 1.36 0.47, 3.88 
No 86.2 (56) 89.4 (59)   
Current smoker (n=149)     
Yes 28.9 (22) 23.3 (17) 1.34 0.64, 2.78 
No 71.1 (54) 76.7 (56)   
Drug use (n=131)     
Yes 4.6 (3) 0 N/A  
No 95.4 (62) 100.0 (66)   
Note. ***p<0.001. **p<0.01. *p<0.05. N/A indicates not applicable. 
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11. Appendix 
Appendix A. Characteristics of survived accidental residential fires, categorized into three groups: 
human involved (unsafe behaviour, inactions), and no human involved in the fire ignition  
 Human involved 
 % within column (n) 
No human 
involved 
% within 
column (n) 
Total 
 
% of Total (n) Unsafe behaviour Inactions 
Room of fire origin      
Kitchen  56.0 (47) 16.0 (4) 15.1 (11) 34.1 (62) 
Bedroom  21.4 (18) 12.0 (3) 12.3 (9) 16.5 (30) 
Ceiling/ roof space 1.2 (1) 8.0 (2) 19.2 (14) 9.3 (17) 
Toilet/ bathroom 2.4 (2) 24.0 (6)  8.2 (6) 7.7 (14) 
Garage  4.8 (4) 0  11.0 (8) 6.6 (12) 
Lounge room 4.8 (4) 8.0 (2) 5.5 (4) 5.5 (10) 
Laundry  0 12.0 (3) 4.1 (3) 3.3 (6) 
Tool shed 3.6 (3) 4.0 (1) 6.8 (5) 4.9 (9) 
Others d 5.8 (5) 16.0 (4) 17.8 (13) 12.2 (22) 
Total 100.0 (84) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (73) 100.0 (182) 
Type of occupancy      
One or two family dwelling 75.0 (63) 88.0 (22) 83.6 (61) 80.2 (146) 
Apartment/ unit 17.9 (15) 8.0 (2) 4.1 (3) 11.0 (20) 
Tool shed 3.6 (3) 4.0 (1) 9.6 (7) 6.0 (11) 
Parking garage 1.2 (1) 0 2.7 (2) 1.7 (3) 
Bungalow 2.4 (2) 0 0 1.1 (2) 
Total 100.0 (84) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (73) 100.0 (182) 
Time of a day      
Night (24:00 – 05:59) 11.3 (7) 15.4 (2) 25.0 (10) 16.5 (19) 
Morning (6:00 – 11:59) 12.9 (8) 15.4 (2) 30.0 (12) 19.1 (22) 
Afternoon (12:00 – 17:59) 45.2 (28) 30.8 (4) 17.5 (7) 33.9 (39) 
Evening (18:00 – 23: 59) 30.6 (19) 38.5 (5) 27.5 (11) 30.4 (35) 
Total 100.0 (62) 100.0 (13) 100.0 (40) 100.0 (115) 
Property ownership (n=182)     
Owned by interviewee 54.8 (46)  60.0 (15) 78.0 (57) 64.8 (118) 
Rented 35.7 (30)  32.0 (8) 17.8 (13) 28.0 (51) 
Public housing 7.1 (6) 8.0 (2) 2.7 (2) 5.5 (10) 
Others b 2.4 (2) 0 1.4 (1) 1.7 (3) 
Total 100.0 (84) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (73) 100.0 (182) 
Internal state of a dwelling     
Clean & tidy 71.7 (43) 88.2 (15) 85.4 (35) 78.8 (93) 
Moderately cluttered  28.3 (17) 11.8 (2) 7.3 (3) 18.6 (22) 
Severely cluttered 0 0 7.3 (3) 2.5 (3) 
Total 100.0 (60) 100.0 (17) 100.0 (41) 100.0 (118) 
Season of a year      
Spring (Sep., Oct., Nov.) 26.2 (22) 32.0 (8) 21.9 (16) 25.3 (46) 
Summer (Dec., Jan., Feb.) 17.9 (15) 20.0 (5) 30.1 (22) 23.1 (42) 
Autumn (March, April, 
May) 
27.4 (23) 32.0 (8) 26.0 (19) 27.5 (50) 
Winter (June, July, August) 28.6 (24) 16.0 (4) 21.9 (16) 24.2 (44) 
Total 100.0 (84) 100.0 (25)  100.0 (73) 100.0 (182) 
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Age      
< 18 years of age 20.2 (17) 0 1.4 (1) 9.9 (18) 
18 – 69 years of age 66.7 (56) 76.0 (19) 79.5 (58) 73.1 (133) 
70 + 13.1 (11) 24.0 (6) 19.1 (14) 17.0 (31) 
Total 100.0 (84) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (73) 100.0 (182) 
Sex      
Male 48.8 (41) 36.0 (9) 46.6 (34) 46.2 (84) 
Female  51.2 (43) 64.0 (16) 53.4 (39) 53.8 (98) 
Total 100.0 (84) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (73) 100.0 (182) 
Living arrangement      
With family 77.8 (63) 88.0 (22) 87.5 (63) 83.1 (148) 
With others 8.6 (7) 0 6.9 (5) 6.7 (12) 
Alone  13.6 (11) 12.0 (3) 5.6 (4) 10.2 (18) 
Total 100.0 (81) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (72) 100.0 (178) 
Country origin      
Australia 62.7 (42) 79.2 (19) 69.1 (47) 67.9 (108) 
Overseas 37.3 (25) 20.8 (5) 30.9 (21) 32.1 (51) 
Total 100.0 (67) 100.0 (24) 100.0 (68) 100.0 (159) 
Occupation      
Type A 6.8 (5) 0 14.3 (10) 8.9 (15) 
Type B  9.5 (7) 13.0 (3) 21.4 (15) 14.9 (25) 
Type C  12.2 (9) 30.4 (7) 20.0 (15) 18.5 (31) 
Type D  10.8 (8) 0 12.9 (9) 10.1 (17) 
Stay home parent/home 
maker 
10.8 (8) 17.4 (4) 12.9 (9) 12.5 (21) 
Student 21.6 (16) 4.3 (1) 4.3 (3) 11.9 (20) 
Sickness benefits / disability 
pension 
14.9 (11) 13.0 (3) 2.9 (2) 9.5 (16) 
Retired 2.7 (2) 17.4 (4) 7.1 (5) 6.5 (11) 
Unemployed 2.7 (2) 4.3 (1) 4.3 (3) 3.6 (6) 
Child  8.1 (6) 0 0 3.6 (6) 
Total 100.0 (74) 100.0 (23) 100.0 (71) 100.0 (168) 
Previous fire experience     
Yes 79.7 (47) 79.2 (9) 84.1 (58) 81.6 (124) 
No 20.3 (12) 20.8 (5) 15.9 (11) 18.4 (28) 
Total 100.0 (59) 100.0 (24) 100.0 (69) 100.0 (152) 
Fire safe knowledge      
No pre-existing knowledge 6.3 (4) 13.6 (3) 6.0 (4) 7.2 (11) 
Basic/ general knowledge 66.7 (42) 72.7 (6) 71.6 (48) 69.8 (106) 
Some specific learning 23.8 (15) 13.6 (3) 22.4 (15) 21.7 (33) 
Technical/ formal training 3.2 (2) 0 0 1.3 (2) 
Total 100.0 (63) 100.0 (22) 100.0 (67) 100.0 (152) 
Location at ignition (n=181)     
In RFO 37.3 (31) 4.0 (1) 6.8 (5) 20.4 (37) 
Not in RFO 62.7 (52) 96.0 (24) 93.2 (68) 79.6 (144) 
Total 100.0 (83) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (73) 100.0 (181) 
Mental illness     
   Yes  29.0 (20) 12.5 (3) 5.6 (4) 16.4 (27) 
No 71.0 (49) 87.5 (21) 94.4 (68) 83.6 (138) 
Total 100.0 (69) 100.0 (24) 100.0 (72) 100.0 (165) 
External condition to a building     
Good overall condition 93.1(54) 100.0 (18) 89.4 (42) 92.7 (114) 
State of disrepair 6.9 (4) 0 10.6 (5) 7.3 (9) 
Total 100.0 (58) 100.0 (18) 100.0 (47) 100.0 (123) 
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Physical illness      
Yes 23.5 (16) 12.0 (3) 8.5 (6) 15.2 (25) 
No 76.5 (52) 88.0 (22) 91.5 (65) 84.8 (139) 
Total 100.0 (68) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (71) 100.0 (164) 
Pre-existing other disability      
Yes  13.2 (9) 8.0 (2) 4.2 (3) 8.5 (14) 
No 86.8 (59) 92.0 (23) 95.8 (69) 91.5 (151) 
Total 100.0 (68) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (72) 100.0 (165) 
Asleep     
Yes 16.4 (10) 31.8 (7) 34.3 (24) 26.8 (41) 
No (awake & unimpaired) 83.6 (51) 68.2 (15) 65.7 (46) 73.2 (112) 
Total 100.0 (61) 100.0 (22) 100.0 (70) 100.0 (153) 
Alcohol use     
Yes 13.8 (9) 4.2 (1) 10.6 (7) 11.0 (17) 
No 86.2 (56) 95.8 (23) 89.4 (59) 88.0 (138) 
Total 100.0 (65) 100.0 (24) 100.0 (66) 100.0 (155) 
Current smoker      
Yes 28.9 (22) 24.0 (6) 23.3 (17) 25.9 (45) 
No 71.1 (54) 76.0 (19) 76.7 (56) 74.1 (129) 
Total 100.0 (76) 100.0 (25) 100.0 (73) 100.0 (174) 
Drug use      
Yes 4.6 (3) 0 0 4.6 (3) 
No 95.4 (62) 100.0 (24) 100.0 (66) 95.4 (152) 
Total 100.0 (65) 100.0 (24) 100.0 (66) 100.0 (155) 
 
d includes spa room, dining room, study room, rubbish area, under house, carport, wall surface, backyard/ 
front yard. b includes visitors. Type A includes senior management and professionals. Type B includes 
managers and associate professionals. Type C includes trades persons, clerks, skilled office and sales. Type D 
includes - machine operators, hospitality, assistants, and labourers. 
 
 
